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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
as trustee of UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT FUND, a common 
trust fund, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PRICEVIEW, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership; 
PRICE K.M., a Utah limited 
partnership; FRANZ C. STANGL, 
III, individually and as 
Personal Representatives of 
the Estate of ELIZABETH ANN 
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1-20, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
The determinative rules and statutes are set forth in the Addendum to the 
Brief of the Appellee Utah State Retirement Board, dated June 3, 1991 (hereinafter the 
"Fund's 1991 Brief) filed in the prior appeal. 
Case No. 920724CA 
(Priority No. 15) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board, as Trustees of the Utah State 
Retirement Fund, (the "Fund") commenced this action to enforce its rights under two 
promissory notes executed by Priceview Ltd., which were secured by two trust deeds 
covering the Creekview Shopping Center located in Carbon County. Defendant F. C. 
Stangl ("Stangl")1 and his wife also guaranteed payment of the two notes pursuant to 
two Guaranty Agreements. This is an appeal from the lower court's: (1) Judgment (R. 
2646) awarding judgment against defendants Priceview, Ltd., Price K. M., and Stangl, 
jointly and severally; and (2) Order Denying Recusal entered May 25, 1990, (R. 1673). 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendants have filed two appeals from the orders and judgments of the 
lower court.2 On its own motion, the Supreme Court entered an Order on September 
18, 1991, consolidating both appeals. The first appeal was from the lower court's entry 
of summary judgment against Stangl (R. 1347), which was certified as a final judgment 
under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (R. 1676). The issues in that appeal 
have been fully briefed and are awaiting disposition by this Court. 
1
 Consistent with the other briefs filed in the two appeals, appellants/defendants 
shall be collectively referred to as "Stangl" in this brief. F. C. Stangl is the only real 
party in interest among the defendants. Priceview Ltd. and Price K.M. have been 
dissolved. Elizabeth Stangl is deceased. 
2
 Stangl's first appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, filed on June 19, 1990, (R. 1679) 
was docketed as Case No. 900302. The second appeal to that Court, filed on July 12, 
1991, (R. 2693) was docketed as Case No. 910333. 
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Pursuant to court's order and decree of foreclosure (R. 1347), the Sheriff of 
Carbon County sold the property that was the subject of the two trust deeds on March 
12, 1990, to the Fund for a sum of $3,500,000.00. (Finding of Fact No 1, R. 2640; 
see also R. 1454, 1456.) 
The case was tried before the lower court sitting without a jury on January 
30, 1991. (R. 2455.) On March 1, 1991, the court issued its Memorandum Decision 
on Trial Matters (R. 2618). The court subsequently entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 2639) and Judgment (R. 2646), from which Stangl took the 
present appeal. Stangl's brief in the second appeal filed on or about October 28, 1992, 
(hereinafter "Stangl's 1992 Brief) and the Fund's present brief are intended to address 
issues raised at trial. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
The lower court awarded a deficiency judgment against Priceview, Ltd., Price 
K.M., and Stangl, jointly and severally, on the First Claim for Relief in the principal 
amount of $2,481,314.16, with interest, and on the Second Claim for Relief in the 
principal amount of $342,265.96, with interest.3 The court further awarded judgment 
on the Fifth Claim for Relief in the principal amount of $57,682.78, with interest. The 
Court also awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees in the amount of $88,129.60, and costs in 
the amount of $572.40. (R. 2646.) 
3
 The judgment against Stangl on the First and Second Claims for Relief was for the 
same amounts as awarded against Stangl pursuant to the court's summary judgment 
dated January 31, 1990. (R. 1347.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board, as trustees of the Utah State 
Retirement Fund, (the "Fund") entered into a Limited Partnership Agreement with Price 
K.M., a Utah general partnership. The Limited Partnership Agreement created Priceview 
Ltd., ("Priceview") as a Utah limited partnership.5 Price KM. was the sole general 
partner of Priceview and the Fund was the sole limited partner. F. C. Stangl, III, was 
the sole general partner of Price K.M. (Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 5, 6; R. 2640-41.) 
In 1983, the Fund loaned $2,350,000.00 to Priceview. Priceview agreed to 
repay the loan pursuant to the terms of a Promissory Note. In 1985 the Fund made a 
second loan to Priceview for $160,000.00, which Priceview also agreed to repay 
according to the terms of a Promissory Note. Both Notes were secured by deeds of 
trust covering property located in Carbon County. Each Note was also personally 
guaranteed by Stangl and his wife.6 
Defendants defaulted on their obligations under the loan documents, 
following which the Fund commenced this action. The lower court entered summary 
judgment against Stangl based on his and his wife's personal guarantees, but reserved 
4
 For a more complete statement of facts, the Fund refers this Court to the 
Statements of Facts contained in Stangl's and the Fund's respective briefs filed in the 
first appeal. 
5
 A copy of the Limited Partnership is attached to Stangl's 1991 Brief as Exhibit 1. 
6
 Copies of the pertinent loan documents are attached to Stangl's 1991 Brief (filed 
in the first appeal) as Exhibits 2-7. See also R. 699-842. 
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for trial the defenses that defendants raised against enforcement of the two Notes.7 (R. 
1347.) Following trial of those issues on January 30, 1991, the court held in favor of 
the Fund. The court found that the Fund did not interfere with Stangl's management of 
the property and that it did not breach its duty of care as a lender. (Findings of Fact 
Nos. 7-9; R. 2641 -42.)8 
Stangl also contended at trial that the Fund had prevented him from disposing 
the property in order to pay off the Notes in full. (Findings of Fact Nos. 7, 9; R. 2641-
42.) The Court found in favor of the Fund on this issue as well, holding that 
"Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving that plaintiff breached any duty to 
defendants to cooperate with defendants in their efforts to sell the shopping center." 
(Finding of Fact No. 9; R. 2642.) The court concluded that the Fund "was under no 
legal duty or obligation to give up its individually held assets, namely the neighboring 
K-Mart, in order to facilitate defendants' sale of the shopping center." The court found 
7
 In his 1991 Brief (filed in his first appeal), Stangl describes these defenses: 
Beginning in 1985, when Mr. Chipman took over responsibility for 
the Fund's involvement in Priceview, Ltd., Mr. Stangl, as general 
partner of Priceview, Ltd., began to experience difficulties and 
frustration in obtaining the cooperation of the Fund in the 
management of the Priceview Property. The difficulty and 
frustration primarily involved the lack of timely and responsive 
answers from the Fund to Mr. Stangl's requests for approval of 
leases, rent adjustments and tenant improvements in accordance 
with the First and Second Trust Deed. 
(Stangl's 1991 Brief, 14-15.) 
8
 The Court found specifically that Stangl failed to introduce any evidence that "the 
actions of the plaintiff in any way impaired the value of the pledged property, 
diminished the income, or prevented the leasing or negotiation for leases on any of the 
pledged property." (Finding of Fact No. 8; R. 2641-42.) 
-5-
"no duty on the part of plaintiff to cooperate in defendants' efforts to sell the shopping 
center." (Conclusion of Law No. 8; R. 2644.)9 
Having held against defendants on the defenses they had raised to the 
enforceability of the Notes, the court entered Judgment against all defendants, jointly 
and severally, for the amounts due on the Notes on the First and Second Claims of the 
Fund's Amended Complaint, which was the same amount of the summary judgment 
previously awarded to the Fund.10 The court held Price K.M. liable for Priceview's debt 
as its general partner, and Stangl liable in his capacity as the general partner of Price 
K.M., pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2-9 (1989) and the Utah Uniform Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-12 (1989). (Conclusion of Law No. 6; R. 2644.) 
The court also found that, in addition to its liability on the Notes, Priceview 
was liable for breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement in the total amount of 
$57,682.78. (Finding of Fact No. 3; R. 2640-41; Judgment, «[ 1(c); R. 2648.)11 The 
9
 Stangl has not appealed from these adverse rulings. 
10
 The Judgment specifically provides that M[t]he liability of defendants Franz C. 
Stangl, III, Priceview Ltd., and Price K.M. for the judgment amounts on the First and 
Second Claims for Relief . . . is joint and several with the liability of Franz C. Stangl, 
III, under the Partial Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure, filed 
January 31, 1990. Satisfaction of one such liability shall constitute satisfaction of the 
other." (Judgment, «I 3; R. 2649.) 
11
 The court found that, under Section 7 of the Limited Partnership Agreement 
provided that the Fund was to receive a percentage of the net cash receipts and that 
Priceview had failed to pay a total principal amount of $33,926.00 due to the Fund. 
(Finding of Fact No. 2; R. 2640; Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 2643.) Although Stangl 
admitted that the payments were due under the Limited Partnership Agreement, he 
contended that the money was used for the "mutual benefit" of the partnership. The 
(continued...) 
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court further awarded the Fund its costs and attorneys' fees. The court held that Price 
K.M. was liable for these additional amounts as Priceview's general partner and that 
Stangl was liable as Price K.M.'s general partner. (Conclusion of Law No. 6; R. 2644.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The loan documents that Stangl signed are clear and unambiguous. The 
lower court properly refused to admit evidence that would vary or contradict the terms 
of the documents, under the parol evidence rule. The evidence proffered by Stangl 
regarding his intent and his understanding was inadmissible. 
At trial, the lower court excluded some of the testimony of Burten Johnson. 
Stangl proffered Johnson's testimony that the Fund treated the partnership transaction 
as an "equity* on its books. Stangl argues on appeal that Johnson's evidence of the 
Fund's post-closing conduct is relevant in determining whether the documents were 
ambiguous under the rule of practical construction. Stangl made no such argument 
below, and cannot make it on appeal for the first time. Moreover, the objection that 
the lower court sustained related only to Johnson's pre-closing conversations with Fred 
Fairclough. Stangl never sought admission of Johnson's statement about the Fund's 
post-closing treatment of the transaction, but merely proffered that statement. At no 
time was the trial court asked to consider that evidence under the doctrine of practical 
construction. 
n(...continued) 
court held that this fact "would not relieve the partnership from the contractual 
obligations as stated in the Limited Partnership Agreement." (Finding of Fact No. 4; R. 
at 2641.) 
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Even if Johnson's testimony were admitted, it is entirely consistent with the 
Limited Partnership Agreement, which provides that the Fund owned an 80 percent 
interest in the partnership. The fact that the Fund may have believed it had an "equity" 
interest in the partnership is not grounds for invalidating the Notes and Guarantees, 
particularly since the Limited Partnership Agreement provides that nothing contained in 
that agreement would relieve the partnership and general partner from any liability for 
repayment of the loan from the Fund. (Limited Partnership Agreement, § 4.07.) 
Further, Stangl has failed to demonstrate why the Notes and Guarantees (the 
terms of which are clear) are somehow unenforceable as a result of the Fund's 
treatment of the partnership agreement on its books. The documents can be read 
consistent with each other and with the Fund's treatment. 
2. The loan documents do not contain a latent ambiguity. Stangl failed to 
raise this issue below and cannot do so for the first time on appeal. Even considered on 
the merits, Stangl's retrospective opinion that the structure is absurd is not a basis for 
invalidating the Notes and Guarantees. 
3. Stangl is estopped from claiming that the loan transactions were ultra 
vires and otherwise has no standing to assert that defense. In any event, the 
transactions were not ultra vires or were ratified by the Utah Legislature's adoption of 
the "prudent investor" standard. 
4. The lower court properly awarded compound interest, since the Notes 
entitle the Fund to interest on "all accrued but unpaid interest" at the rate of 18 
percent. 
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5. Stangl cannot argue that the second judgment against him is duplicative 
of the first, since this issue was never raised below. On the merits, the second 
judgment on the First and Second Claims for Relief is identical to the summary 
judgment against Stangl, although both judgments are based on different legal theories. 
The Fund is only entitled to a single recovery. 
The summary judgment against Stangl was not barred by the One Action 
Rule. Even if it was barred, that defense is now moot, since the real property has been 
foreclosed and sold a public auction. 
6. The lower court properly declined to recuse itself. Judge Bunnell's 
membership in the retirement system administered by the Fund (like that of every other 
judge and justice in the State) is not a substantial enough interest to require 
disqualification. Stangl's affidavit of disqualification was not timely. The lower court's 
adverse evidentiary rulings do not show any bias against Stangl. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THE DOCUMENTS WERE UNAMBIGUOUS. 
Although he concedes that the loan documents "appear to be unambiguous," 
Stangl argues that "the parties consistently treated the transaction as an equity 
investment." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12.) The parties' conduct, Stangl claims, shows 
that the parties intended that the Fund make an "equity investment" in the property 
rather than a loan to the limited partnership, thus creating an ambiguity in the 
documentation. Id. at 5, 12, 18. Stangl asserts that the parol evidence rule does not 
-9-
exclude evidence of the conduct of the parties if that conduct creates an ambiguity by 
demonstrating that the documents have a different meaning. Id. at 7. 
At the trial, Stangl sought to prove that the parties considered the transaction 
to be the purchase of an "equity" by the Fund. Stangl attempted to introduce his own 
testimony and the testimony of one of the Fund's former employees, Burten "Butch" 
Johnson. The trial court excluded the evidence on the Fund's objections based on the 
parol evidence rule and relevance. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 60-61, 194.) The court's rulings 
were proper and should not be reversed. As argued below, in proffering his own 
testimony, Stangl did not give any evidence of conduct of the parties. He testified only 
regarding his own understanding of the transaction, which was clearly inadmissible 
under the parol evidence rule. 
Stangl also sought to introduce the testimony of Burten Johnson that the 
Fund treated the Creekview property as an "equity1 on its books. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 
200; quoted in Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 16.) As argued below, Stangl proffered that 
testimony as part of a lengthy proffer and never actually sought its admission into 
evidence under the doctrine of practical construction. The only question to which the 
Fund objected related to Johnson's pre-closing conversations regarding the transaction. 
Stangl cannot raise the practical construction rule on appeal for the first time. 
Moreover, Johnson's statement was hardly evidence of the Fund's conduct that created 
an ambiguity. The Fund does not dispute that it owned an 80 percent interest in the 
limited partnership, pursuant to Section 4.01 of the Limited Partnership Agreement. 
That fact scarcely justifies a finding that the two promissory notes signed by Priceview 
and guaranteed by Stangl have no legal effect. 
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A. Stangl's excluded testimony does not contain any admissible 
evidence of an ambiguity in the documentation. 
Stangl contends that the lower court erred in not considering his own 
testimony regarding his "understanding of the partnership/loan transaction with the 
Fund." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12.)12 Despite StangPs analysis of the doctrine of 
practical construction (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 8-12), the testimony that he proffered 
simply does not constitute evidence of post-closing conduct of the parties. Although 
parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of explaining an ambiguity contained in the 
writing,13 Stangl did not testify regarding the conduct of the parties after the 
transaction closed. He stated only what his understanding was at the time of the 
closing. 
In his brief, Stangl confused the parol evidence rule with the doctrine of 
practical construction. He cites the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bullfrog Marina, 
Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), for the rule that a 
contract may be considered to be ambiguous "[w]here the parties have demonstrated by 
their action and performance that to them the contract meant something quite different, 
12
 This is not the first time that Stangl has argued that the documents were 
ambiguous. In his first brief (filed in the first appeal), Stangl argued that the 
documents were ambiguous because the Limited Partnership Agreement appeared to 
conflict with provisions of the trust deeds. (Stangl's 1991 Brief, at 31-36.) The Fund 
responded to this argument in its brief (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 19-28). Having now 
obtained new counsel, Stangl has continued his search for an ambiguity, arguing now 
that the documents were ambiguous because Stangl did not intend to be liable on the 
transaction and because the Fund treated the transaction as an "equity." 
13
 Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 
1990); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261, 267, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 
1972). 
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the meaning and intent of the parties should be enforced. In such a situation, the 
parties by their actions have created the ambiguity to bring the rule into operation." 28 
Utah 2d at 268, 501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added). This rule applies only where the 
parties by their post-closing conduct demonstrate an intent different from the 
documentation. 
The parol evidence rule excludes evidence that would vary or contradict the 
terms of an unambiguous written contract. Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) ("Parol evidence is generally not 
admissible to explain the intent of a contract which is clear on its face").14 Under the 
parol evidence rule, evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations, 
communications, and understandings are inadmissible. 
The parol evidence rule and the doctrine of practical construction are 
mutually exclusive: the former excludes pre-execution and contemporaneous extrinsic 
14
 See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) ("Where a 
contract is clear on its face, extraneous or parol evidence is generally not admissible to 
explain the intent of the contract."); Rice, Melbv Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
646 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1982) (M[P]arol evidence cannot be used to vary the terms of 
an agreement clear on its face," and cannot "be admitted to show that defendant 
'promised' to do anything other than as is stated on the face of the agreement."); Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp. 655 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1982) ("The terms of 
the guarantee are clear and unambiguous, and need no parol evidence to clarify."); 
Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (1958) ("Unless 
there is clear ambiguity or uncertainty in the language . . . there is no justification for 
interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources. It would defeat the very purpose 
of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent 
with its terms to prove that the parties did not mean what they said, or to use such 
inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where none 
would otherwise exist."); Richlands Irr. Co. v. Westview Irr. Co.. 96 Utah 403, 418, 80 
P.2d 458, 464 (1938) ("[W]hen a writing is clear and plain on its face, and not 
ambiguous or doubtful, there is no room for construction but resort must be had to the 
language employed in determining meaning or intention"). 
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evidence; the latter relates only to the post-execution conduct and actions of the parties. 
Even if a court were to apply the doctrine of practical construction, the parol evidence 
rule would still exclude extrinsic evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations, or statements of what the parties intended, thought, believed or 
understood concerning the interpretation or the purpose of the writings. Courts 
applying the doctrine of practical construction may only consider the parties' post-
execution actions and performance. 
The decision in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1972), explains this distinction. In that case the trial court first determined 
whether a lease was integrated by considering extrinsic evidence of the "entire 
transaction, including the purpose to be served." 28 Utah 2d at 267, 501 P.2d at 270. 
Based on that evidence the trial court held, and the Utah Supreme Court agreed, that 
the lease was not integrated. Having concluded that the lease was not integrated, the 
Bullfrog Court applied the doctrine of practical construction and considered the parties' 
post-execution performance in order to resolve the ambiguity in the contract. The 
defendant had calculated an incentive commission in a manner different from the 
formula contained in a written contract. The plaintiff for some time accepted the 
defendant's calculation without protest before the dispute arose. Based on the 
defendant's post-execution performance, the Bullfrog court enforced the defendant's 
calculation. 28 Utah 2d at 268, 501 P.2d at 271. 
Each of the decisions cited by Stangl apply the Bullfrog rule by interpreting 
and enforcing written agreements according to the parties' post-execution actions and 
performance. Not one of these decisions considered pre-execution or contemporaneous 
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extrinsic evidence of what the parties intended or understood. See Eie v. St. Benedicts 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981) (court interpreted and enforced contract 
according to post-execution performance of defendant who paid 90% of billings, which 
plaintiff accepted rather than flat fee of $90 as stated in written agreement); Bullough 
v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965) (court considered parties' post-execution 
performance of twenty years to interpret written agreements); Town of Estes Park v. 
Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.. 677 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1984) (court held that 
town was not entitled to return water flow under written contract because it had never 
asserted a right to such flows subsequent to executing the contract). 
At the trial, Stangl proffered testimony only of his understanding and intent 
at the time of the closing of the transaction. The lower court properly excluded that 
testimony under the parol evidence rule. Stangl argues on appeal: 
In this case, although the loan documents appear to be 
unambiguous, the parties consistently treated the transaction as an 
equity investment. During the trial, Mr. Stangl proffered testimony 
that the parties' intent was that the Fund would invest the 
$4,350,000 in the shopping center as an equity. The only purpose 
for structuring the agreement as a loan was to provide certain tax 
benefits to Mr. Stangl. Mr. Stangl testified by proffer, his 
understanding of the partnership/loan transaction with the Fund. 
(Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12; emphasis added.) 
Stangl's lawyer asked him a number of questions about his "understanding" 
about the transaction. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 74, lines 1, 7; 75, lines 24-25; 77, lines 1-3.) 
Stangl testified that he did not intend to be personally responsible for the debt in spite 
of the language of the documents. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 76, lines 24-25; 77, lines 1-3.) "It 
never entered my mind in any way," he testified, that he would be responsible for 
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payment of the debt if there were a default. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 77, lines 18-19.) 
According to his proffer, he signed the promissory notes (and presumably the 
guarantees) to "be at risk" so that he could obtain tax benefits from the transaction.15 
(Tr. [1-30-91], at 76, lines 11-19.) 
By arguing that the transaction was structured as a loan solely for the 
purpose of allowing him to claim tax benefits without actually placing him at any risk 
on the notes and guarantees, Stangl seems to concede that the whole transaction was a 
sham and a fraud against the government. This Court should not ignore the plain 
language of the loan documents to enforce Stangl's fraudulent intent by allowing him to 
claim both tax benefits and to avoid paying the loan according to the documents.16 
15
 According to Stangl's testimony, the tax advantage "was a significant part of the 
bargain, that I was to receive a hundred percent of those tax benefits." (Tr. [1-30-91], 
at 76.) In his earlier brief, however, Stangl argued that, by giving Stangl only a 20 
percent interest in partnership assets with rights to only 20 percent of the net cash 
receipts, while requiring him to assume 100 percent of the losses, the Limited 
Partnership Agreement created an "obvious disproportionate allocation of interest and 
risk." (Stangl's 1991 Brief, at 33.) In his most recent brief, through his new counsel, 
Stangl now argues that the tax benefits had no value to the Fund, but that they were of 
"significant" value to him. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 14.) Stangl seems unable to make 
up his mind about the real purpose of the transaction and whether the apportionment 
of loss was a positive or negative aspect of the transaction. 
16
 Stangl's two briefs demonstrate his uncertainty regarding the purpose of the 
transaction. In his first brief, Stangl argued that the notes and security instrument were 
used by the parties, not to give Stangl tax benefits, but to enable the Fund "to acquire 
an ownership interest in an income-producing property." (Stangl's 1991 Brief, at 33.) 
At the trial and in his second brief, however, Stangl saw the notes as nothing more than 
a sham, a fraudulent device through which he would obtain additional tax benefits. 
Stangl's confusion over the purpose of the transaction demonstrates the soundness of 
the policies underlying the parol evidence rule. By enforcing the rule, the lower court 
avoided the kind of speculative and self-serving testimony Stangl sought to introduce. 
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Stangl's evidence clearly violated the parol evidence rule, and the lower court 
properly excluded it. Stangl proffered no evidence that he acted or performed, after the 
closing, in a manner demonstrating that the loans were actually an equity investment 
by the Fund.17 The doctrine of practical construction does not apply to his testimony. 
The trial court was correct in excluding Stangl's testimony and ruling solely upon the 
unambiguous language of the loan documents. 
B. The lower court properly excluded the testimony of Burten Johnson 
or, if not, the exclusion was harmless error since his testimony is 
not inconsistent with the terms of the documents. 
1. Stangl cannot raise the practical construction doctrine for 
the first time on appeal. 
Stangl argues that the Fund's treatment on its books of the partnership 
transaction with Priceview as an "equity" is evidence of post-closing conduct that is an 
exception to the parol evidence rule. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 7-12.) Stangl did not 
make this argument at trial and cannot do so for the first time on appeal. Mascaro v. 
Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
2. The only objection to Johnson's testimony was properly 
sustained under the parol evidence rule, since it related to 
pre-closing negotiations. 
Stangl introduced the testimony of Burten Johnson, who had closed the 
Priceview transaction when he was employed by the Fund. During Johnson's 
examination on direct, Stangl's counsel asked Johnson to testify regarding a 
17
 The contrary is true. As shown below, Stangl treated the Notes as valid by 
making payments to the Fund for nearly five years. 
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conversation that he, Johnson, had had with a mortgage banker named Fred Fairclough, 
who had first "brought" the proposal to the Fund. Stangl's lawyer asked the witness, 
"Did Mr. Fairclough initially present the package as a loan request or as a sales-
proposed sale of the property?" (Tr. [1-30-91], at 194.) The Fund objected based on 
relevance, materiality, and the parol evidence rule, which the court sustained. Id. 
Thereafter, Stangl proffered Johnson's testimony (taking ten pages of trial transcript), 
including his testimony that the Fund booked the transaction as an "equity" after it was 
closed. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 194-204.) 
After the objection was sustained, Stangl made no further attempt to 
introduce Johnson's testimony, but merely proffered it all. The court had no 
opportunity to determine whether the questions relating to the Fund's post-closing 
conduct was admissible and counsel for the Fund had no opportunity to object. The 
only question to which the Fund objected related to Johnson's pre-closing conversation 
with Fred Fairclough. The objection was properly sustained since the conversation 
occurred prior to the closing and clearly violated the parol evidence rule. Yet Stangl's 
counsel continued to ask Johnson other questions, including questions relating to the 
Fund's post-closing treatment of the transaction, as part of the proffer.18 The record 
contains no objection to Johnson's evidence regarding post-closing conduct nor does it 
contain any ruling by which the court refused to admit Johnson's testimony. Stangl 
18
 The record is clear that all of the questions put to Johnson were part of the 
proffer. The Fund's counsel clarified that Johnson's testimony was only being proffered 
and that the Fund had not been expected to object to any part of it. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 
204.) 
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cannot claim that the lower court erred in excluding testimony of post-closing conduct 
when the only objection that was sustained related to pre-closing negotiations. 
If Stangl believed that Johnson's testimony regarding the post-closing conduct 
of the Fund in booking the transaction as an "equity" (as opposed to the pre-closing 
negotiations with Fairclough) were probative under the practical construction doctrine, 
he should have stopped making his proffer and should have sought to introduce the 
evidence of the Fund's post-closing conduct. As it was, the Fund had no chance to 
object to Johnson's testimony regarding post-closing conduct or even to agree that it 
was probative. Had the trial court been given the opportunity to consider Stangl's 
argument that Johnson's testimony was relevant under the practical construction 
doctrine, the court may well have allowed the testimony to be admitted. In addition, 
the Fund would have had the opportunity to cross-examine Johnson on the question 
and to call its own witnesses to explain to the trial court what it means to book a 
partnership transaction as an "equity." As it was, Stangl merely proffered Johnson's 
testimony without explaining to the court that it was admissible as evidence of post-
closing conduct. He never asked the court to consider the matter and the court made 
no ruling excluding Johnson's testimony. 
Stangl now argues, for the first time, that Johnson's testimony was relevant to 
show that "the Fund treated this transaction as an equity investment and even carried 
this transaction on its books as an equity." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 15.) As argued 
above, Stangl cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. Had he done more 
than merely proffer Johnson's testimony following the courfs sustaining of an objection 
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to an entirely different question, the matter could have been properly addressed below. 
As it is, neither the Fund nor the court had the chance to consider the question. 
3. Johnson's testimony that the Fund booked the transaction 
as an "equity" is consistent with the documents and does 
not create an ambiguity. At worst its exclusion was 
harmless error. 
Even considered on the merits, Johnson's testimony was properly excluded or, 
if it should not have been, it was harmless error under Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In his brief, Stangl fails to explain why Johnson's testimony might have 
required a different result even if it had been admitted. 
Although Stangl insists that the Fund's involvement in the Creekview 
Shopping Center constituted an "equity investment," he does not explain why that fact 
renders the Notes and Guarantees unenforceable on their terms. The Fund was an 
owner of the limited partnership and could properly treat the transaction as an equity 
transaction on its books. According to Section 4.01 of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement, the Fund, as limited partner, had an 80 percent interest in the partnership. 
Burten Johnson testified in his proffer that it was that 80 percent that constituted the 
"equity" in which the Fund had some ownership. 
According to Johnson's proffered testimony at trial, the Fund had a pre-
existing panicipating loan with Stangl for the development of the Creekview Shopping 
Center, which was restructured in 1983 when the panicipating mongage was convened 
to a limited partnership. (Tr. [1-30-911, at 200.) The conversion resulted in an 
increase in the Fund's interest from 75 to 80 percent. Stangl proffered the following 
testimony from Johnson: 
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Q (By Mr. Hunt) Mr. Johnson, just one other area: When 
the-when the second-when the transaction was restructured in '83, 
was the interest of the-the equity interest of The Fund increased or 
decreased or do you recall? 
A It was increased from 75 percent to 80 percent. 
Q Why it went from 75 to 80. 
A So as part of that, when I went to the Board with the 
proposed restructure, one of the Board embers felt like we should 
get more. So basically I went back and negotiated for another five 
percent equity position in the deal. 
(Tr. [1-30-91], at 203-04; emphasis added.) 
When Johnson testified that the Fund treated the Creekview Shopping Center 
"as an equity1' on its books (Tr. [1-30-91], at 200), he was referring to the Fund's 80 
percent ownership in the limited partnership. The Fund does not dispute that it owned 
80 percent of the partnership, as provided in Section 4.01 of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement. The fact that the Fund owned 80 percent of the partnership does not 
render the Limited Partnership Agreement ambiguous nor does it invalidate the Notes 
and Guarantees. 
The Fund's ownership interest in the partnership is not inconsistent the 
partnership's obligations to repay the loan. Whether or not the Fund considered its 
interest as an "equity," the parties clearly and unambiguously provided that the loan 
would be made by the Fund and repaid according to the terms of the Notes and 
Guaranty Agreements. The parties specifically agreed that nothing in the Limited 
Partnership Agreement "shall relieve or be deemed to relieve the Partnership or the 
General Partner from any liability for repayment of the loan made or to be made by the 
-20-
Limited Partner under Section 4.03 hereof."19 Stangl does not explain why he believes 
the loan should not be repaid as a result of the Fund's execution of the Limited 
Partnership Agreement. 
In the heading of Subpoint I/A of his brief, Stangl argues: "The parties' 
conduct created an ambiguity because they both treated the transaction as an equity 
investment." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 8.) Stangl contends that "the parties consistently 
treated the transaction as an equity investment" (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12), yet he fails 
to describe the legal significance of that fact. One searches his brief in vain for any 
analysis of this issue. He concludes that subpoint with the assertion that, "[b]ecause 
the parties' actions have demonstrated an intent different from that expressed in the 
written agreements, their actions have created an ambiguity." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 
18.) Yet he fails to describe how their post-closing actions showed a different intent 
than that expressed in the documents. Stangl does not describe how the Fund's conduct 
after the closing created an ambiguity. He does not even state what the ambiguity is. 
Most importantly, he fails to state how, exactly, the Fund's ownership of 80 percent of 
the partnership affects the validity of the Notes and Guarantees. As noted above, the 
19
 In Section 4.03 of the Limited Partnership Agreement the parties agreed that the 
Fund would make a loan to Priceview in the amount of $4,350,000.00 "in accordance 
with the terms, conditions, and provisions set forth in the Promissory Note and 
Subsequent Disbursement Agreement" attached to the agreement. Each of the Notes 
signed by Priceview obligates the partnership to pay the Fund in "lawful money of the 
United States of America." The Limited Partnership Agreement contains other 
references to the repayment of the loan. The agreement requires recognized Priceview 
to repay the loan in the event of its dissolution. (Limited Partnership Agreement, § 
10.02(a).) The agreement contemplates the repayment of the loan in defining the term 
"net cash receipts" as being net of certain sums, including "[a] 11 principal and interest 
payments actually paid to the Limited Partner in repayment of the loan referred to in 
Section 4.03 hereof." (Limited Partnership Agreement, § 7.01.) 
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Limited Partnership Agreement provides that its execution would not relieve the 
partnership or the general partner from any liability for repayment of the loan. 
(Limited Partnership Agreement, § 4.07.) 
The testimony of Johnson and Chipman that the Fund booked the transaction 
as an "equity" is entirely consistent with the Limited Partnership Agreement. It is also 
consistent with partnership's obligations, guaranteed by Stangl, to repay the 
$4,350,000.00 that the Fund loaned to the partnership. StangPs brief leaves many 
questions unanswered: What conduct of the Fund after the closing is inconsistent with 
the documents? Where is the ambiguity? What is the relevance of the Fund's 80 
percent ownership in the partnership? Why does Stangl believe that the Notes and 
Guarantees are unenforceable? Does Stangl believe that the Notes do not need to be 
repaid simply because the Fund owned 80 percent of the partnership? On these issues, 
Stangl's brief is silent. 
Stangl seeks a reversal of the judgment because the lower court excluded 
evidence proffered by Stangl and Johnson. As argued above, Stangl's testimony was 
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Johnson's testimony, however, was entirely 
consistent with the Limited Partnership Agreement. Since that document speaks for 
itself as to its legal meaning and effect, Johnson's testimony was unnecessary for the 
coun to be able to interpret the document. Where is the error? Had Johnson's proffer 
been admitted, the court would have had additional evidence that the Fund owned 80 
percent of the limited partnership, exactly as provided in Section 4.01 of the Limited 
Partnership Agreement. Johnson's proffered testimony does not create an ambiguity. 
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Nor does it show that the Fund placed a practical construction on the transaction that 
was inconsistent with the documents. 
Stangl fails to address these important issues. Johnson did not testify that he 
believed that the Notes and Guarantees signed by defendants were somehow rendered 
unenforceable because the Fund treated its ownership of the partnership as an equity. 
The lower court found that the Notes and Guarantees were enforceable. This Court 
should not disturb that judgment. 
C. The parties acted and performed consistent with the language of the 
loan documents. 
1. There was no evidence that the parties by their actions 
treated the loan documents as unenforceable after the 
closing. 
Stangl asserts that the Fund's post-closing conduct in treating the transaction 
as an "equity," demonstrates "an intent different from that expressed in the written 
agreements." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 18.) As argued above, this issue cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. Even so, the Fund's treatment of its limited partnership 
interest as an "equity" was consistent with the loan documents. Moreover, the evidence 
at trial of the parties' post-closing conduct clearly reveals their intent: Priceview was a 
borrower and the Fund was a lender. 
The record of the trial court demonstrates that Stangl acted as a debtor and 
the Fund as his lender consistent with the unambiguous language of the loan 
documents. From April 1983 to November 1985, Stangl made monthly payments due 
under the first Promissory Note and Trust Deed. After failing to pay the monthly 
payments from December 1985 through June 1986, Stangl resumed making payments 
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again from July 1986 through July 1988. (Chipman Affidavit, Exhibits "N" and "O," R. 
843-55.) Stangl fails to explain why, if the loan documents were unenforceable, he 
caused Priceview to make payments under the Notes for a period of five years. 
The post-execution correspondence between the Fund and Stangl is also 
consistent with the loan documents and creates no ambiguity. For example, in a letter 
to the Fund from Robert Elliott, StangPs property manager, dated October 7, 1986, 
Elliott sought the Fund's approval for termination of a lease. He stated: 
In several instances in sections of the Trust Deed Note and the Loan 
Agreement document encumbering the Creekview Center, we, as the 
borrower, have pledged to Utah State Retirement Fund all the 
Leases (among other things) in the center as collaterral [sic] against 
the loan. 
My concern is that altering or terminating any Lease 
Agreement which is considered collateral against the loan without 
your approval could be construed as a default of the terms of the 
Loan Agreement. If this is not your interpretation of the Trust Deed 
Note and the Loan Agreement document and if you are of the 
opinion that we are free to alter and/or terminate a Creekview 
Center Lease Agreement in an appropriate circumstance, please 
advise. 
(Exhibit P-48. Tr [1-30-92], at 147-48.) 
In his letter, Stangl's property manager recognizes the validity of the note, the 
trust deed, and the loan agreement. He refers to Stangl as "the borrower" and seems to 
appreciate the risks of violating the loan documents. He does not claim that the 
documents were unenforceable or that the Fund only had some sort of "equity" interest 
in the project. Elliott was anxious to avoid a default under the documents and so 
sought the Fund's approval of a lease termination. The Fund gave its consent to the 
termination under paragraph 13 of the Trust Deeds. (Exhibit P-12; see also Tr. [1-30-
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91], at 151.) Other correspondence between the parties shows that there was no 
confusion over the Fund's role as a lender and StangPs as a borrower.20 
Not only did Stangl make the monthly loan payments for five years, but 
during that period, he referred to the Fund as "his lender."21 Burten Johnson, a 
witness called by Stangl, acknowledged that the Fund loaned money to the partnership. 
He testified that the Fund's original participating mortgage was converted to "a 
partnership with just a loan against the partnership." (Tr. [1-30-91], at 200.) When 
Stangl defaulted in 1988, the Fund demanded payment, filed this action, and foreclosed 
on the property. 
Stangl contends that "until the time the partnership began to lose money, 
both parties treated the transaction as an equity investment." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 
22.) This contention is entirely unsupported by the citation to Stangl's testimony at 
20
 See, e.g., Exhibit P-15 (letter to tenant from Stangl in which he refers to the Fund 
as his "partner and Lender"); Exhibit P-23 (letter to Stangl from the Fund, stating that 
the Fund, as "lender," would expect to receive the full balance owing in the event that 
the property were sold); Exhibit D-16 (letter to Stangl's property manager from Fund 
stating that the Fund "placed a participating mortgage" on the shopping center property 
and referring to provisions of Limited Partnership Agreement); Exhibit P-33 (letter from 
Stangl's attorney to potential buyer, stating that "Mr. and Mrs. Stangl as owners of the 
[shopping center] property shall deal with it as they deem appropriate and in their best 
interests"); Exhibit P-34 (letter to Stangl from the Fund requesting payment of 
delinquent payments due under note); Exhibit P-38 (letter to Stangl from the Fund 
identifying itself as "lender on the Creekview Shopping Center," demanding payment of 
delinquent payments); Exhibit P-42 (letter to Stangl from the Fund demanding payment 
of delinquencies due under Notes and threatening enforcement of the Notes and 
Guarantees); Exhibit P-46 (letter to Stangl from the Fund containing final demand for 
payment under Notes). 
21
 Stangl himself also referred to the Fund as "the lender" in his proffered testimony 
at trial, which he quotes in his brief. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 77, line 14, quoted in Stangl's 
1992 Brief, at 15.) 
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trial. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 88.)22 Stangl did not testify that the partnership began to lose 
money nor did he assert that the Fund considered the transaction an "equity" until 
September of 1986. Rather, he testified that he believed that it was more difficult to 
obtain the Fund's consent on his requests for modification or termination of leases at 
the Creekview Shopping Center. There was no evidence at trial that the Fund 
considered the transaction to be solely an "equity investment."23 There was no 
evidence that the Fund treated the loan documents as unenforceable after their 
execution. 
2. Stangl did not rely on the Fund's internal 
accounting. 
Evidence of that the Fund treated the partnership transaction as an "equity" 
on its books is irrelevant and immaterial in relation to the enforceability of the loan 
documents. There was no evidence, however, that Stangl relied in or acquiesced in the 
Fund's treatment of the transaction as an "equity." In Hodges Irr. Co. v. Swan Creek 
Canal Co., I l l Utah 405, 181 P.2d 217 (1947), the Utah Supreme Court considered 
22
 The part of the transcript to which Stangl cited involved an entirely different 
issue. Stangl testified that, after he received the Fund's letter dated September 29, 
1986, (Exhibit D-16), he believed the Fund had "flipped a switch" by making it more 
difficult to get answers regarding proposed lease modifications. Exhibit D-16 was 
written in response to Stangl's request to terminate a lease. (Exhibit P-13; Tr. [1-30-
91], at 146.) In response to Exhibit D-16, Stangl's property manager, Robert Elliott, 
wrote the Fund again requesting approval of the termination. (Exhibit P-48.) The 
Fund responded by giving its approval under the Trust Deed. (Exhibit P-12; Tr. [1-30-
91], at 146-55.) This evidence contained no reference to the Fund's suddenly treating 
the transaction as a loan. The Fund never though of itself as anything other than a 
limited partner and a lender. 
23
 As noted above, Burten Johnson acknowledged that, although the Fund owned 80 
percent of the limited partnership, the partnership had borrowed the loan from the 
Fund. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 200.) 
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when evidence of a practical construction by the parties would justify a finding that a 
contract is ambiguous: 
'To warrant the court in according great weight to, or adopting, a 
practical construction by the parties, it is necessary and sufficient 
that each party shall have placed the same construction on the 
contract. While the construction placed by one party on his own 
language in a contract is the highest evidence of his own intention, 
the meaning of the contract cannot be established by the 
construction placed on it by one of the parties, unless such 
interpretation has been made to and relied on by the other party, or 
has been known to or acquiesced in by the other party.' 
I l l Utah at 412, 181 P.2d at 220-21 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 325(b), at 764) 
(emphasis added). 
There was no evidence at trial that the Fund represented to Stangl that the 
loans were an "equity" or that Stangl relied on or acquiesced in such a representation. 
There was also no evidence that Stangl even knew how the Fund treated the 
transaction on its books or that he understood what it meant to treat a transaction as 
an "equity." Stangl did not testify that he acted in a manner that indicated the loans 
were an "equity." Rather, as noted above, the record demonstrates that for five years 
Stangl made the monthly loan payments to the Fund as his "lender." In the words of 
Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965), cited by Stangl, his own 
'"actions speak louder than words.'" 400 P.2d at 23 (citation omitted).24 
24
 Stangl also cited the testimony of Mr. William Chipman in which Mr. Chipman 
became confused during a line of questioning relating to capital contributions. (Stangl's 
1992 Brief, at 22-23.) The witness's misunderstanding was apparent from his testimony 
that there was no written agreement by which the Fund agreed to make additional 
capital contributions to the partnership under Section 4.04 of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 232-33.) Stangl fails to explain how Chipman's 
misunderstanding a question creates an ambiguity in the loan documents. Moreover, 
(continued...) 
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D. The Court properly excluded the testimony of William Chipman. 
Stangl complains that the lower court committed plain error by excluding 
William Chipman's testimony when he was asked whether the Fund treated the property 
as an "equity." The court sustained the objection based on relevance, materiality, and 
the parol evidence rule. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 236-37.)25 As with Burten Johnson's 
testimony, Stangl did not argue at trial that the evidence was admissible under the rule 
of practical construction. He cannot now raise that issue on appeal for the first time. 
Had he done so, the trial court could have corrected any error by admitting the 
testimony and the Fund could have clarified the question by introducing additional 
evidence regarding the Fund's manner of treating the transaction on its books. 
Even if Chipman had been allowed to testify that the Fund booked the 
transaction as an "equity," that evidence would have been consistent with the Limited 
Partnership Agreement and would not have justified a ruling that the Notes and 
Guarantees were unenforceable. The court did not err in excluding Chipman's 
testimony. The documents contain a clear and unambiguous statement of the 
obligations between the parties, including the payment obligations under the Notes and 
Guarantees. The fact that the Fund may have treated the partnership on its internal 
24(...continued) 
Stangl's attempt to create an ambiguity by this confused testimony fails under the rule 
of practical construction in Hodges Irr. Co. Also, the record clearly reflects that the trial 
court, as the finder of fact, was not confused over Chipman's testimony. (Tr. [1-30-91], 
at 232, lines 9-11.) 
25
 In sustaining the objection, the court stated that the Fund's "category of treatment 
as far as their internal operation is concerned does not change the legal obligations on 
the parties as reflected by the documents they executed." Id. 
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books as an "equity" hardly justifies a finding that the Notes and Guarantees are 
unenforceable. Even if the court erred in excluding the evidence, that error was 
harmless. 
E. William Chipman's deposition is not part of the record on appeal. 
Stangl also refers to the deposition testimony of William Chipman. (Stangl's 
1992 Brief, at 17-18.) The Court should not consider the deposition of William 
Chipman on this appeal because Stangl did not make it available to the lower court. 
Depositions not available to the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal. 
See Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989); Conder v. 
A.I,. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987). As such, this 
Court should not consider Chipman's deposition. 
Even if the Court considers Chipman's deposition testimony, however, it is 
clear that Chipman is not referring to the specific transaction at issue in this case. 
Stangl quotes the following passage from Chipman's deposition: 
Q You heard Mr. Johnson testily that he considered these 
participating mortgages to be equities because the Fund had great 
than 50 percent position. Did you share that conclusion? 
A Yes, I think I shared that with - with him. 
(Chipman depo., at 24, quoted in Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 18; emphasis added.) 
When Chipman referred to "these participating mortgages" he did not mean 
the Limited Pannership Agreement or to the 1983 and 1985 loans to Priceview. Even 
so, the fact that the Fund may have booked a participating mortgage as an "equity1 
because the Fund was entitled to participate in more than 50 percent of the cashflow 
does not render a promissory note and guarantee unenforceable. Under the facts of the 
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present case, the Fund's treatment of its interest in the Priceview limited partnership an 
"equity1' would similarly have no effect on the obligations set forth in the loan 
documents. The lower court correctly excluded Chipman's testimony. Even if the 
exclusion were erroneous, however, it was a harmless error that would not have 
affected the outcome of the trial. The fact that the Fund may have treated the 
transaction as an "equity" would create no ambiguity in the Notes and Guarantees. 
II. 
THE LOAN DOCUMENTS DO NOT CONTAIN A LATENT AMBIGUITY. 
A. Stangl did not raise this issue below and cannot now raise it for the 
first time on appeal. 
Stangl argues, for the first time, that a "latent ambiguity exists in the 
combination of the partnership agreement and the loan documents." (Stangl's 1992 
Brief, at 21.) He did not raise this issue before the trial court, however, and cannot do 
so for the first time on appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine 
Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990). 
B. The loan documents do not contain a latent ambiguity. 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Stangl's contention, the lower court 
judgment must be affirmed. Stangl argues that the Limited Partnership Agreement and 
the loan documents are latently ambiguous because, read together, they would "produce 
an absurd result." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 21.) Stangl's "absurdity" argument seems to 
run like this: Stangl contributed property to the partnership valued at $500,000.00, for 
which he received a 20 percent ownership of the partnership. The Fund contributed its 
willingness to make a loan to the partnership in the amount of $4,350,000.00. Its 
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contribution was valued at $100.00. The Fund received an 80 percent ownership of the 
partnership. This "simply did not make sense" asserts Stangl. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 
21.) In spite of Stangl's current displeasure with the transaction, this Court should not 
reverse the judgment based on such a scanty and ill-informed analysis. 
In arguing that the structure of the relationship between the Fund and 
Stangl26 did not make sense, Stangl overlooks other fundamental features of the 
Limited Partnership Agreement. For example, Stangl received 100 percent of the losses, 
which gave him substantial tax benefits. (Limited Partnership Agreement § 6.04.)27 
Stangl was entitled to manage the project (id. § 5.01) for which he was to be paid a 
management fee equal to 4 percent of the total rents collected (id- § 5.03). In addition, 
Stangl was entitled to 20 percent of the "net cash receipts" generated from the project. 
(Id. § 7.02.) On Priceview's dissolution, Stangl would receive a distribution of his 
capital contribution of $500,000.00 after payment of other creditors (including the 
Fund's loan) and after the Fund had been paid its $100.00 contribution. (Id. § 
10.02(d).) Seen in this light, the Limited Partnership Agreement does not seem all that 
absurd. It was hardly a one-sided transaction in which Stangl received no benefit 
whatsoever. If Stangl wanted the risks and benefits apportioned differently, he should 
have bargained for it during the negotiations so that it would be properly reflected in 
26
 As noted above, the term "Stangl" includes Price K.M., of which Stangl was 
general partner and which, in turn, was general partner of Priceview. 
27
 As noted above, Stangl proffered his testimony at trial that "there were special tax 
benefits that the Retirement Fund was a non-taxable entity, and they had no desire or 
ability to get the tax benefits that flowed from the shopping center. It was a significant 
pan of the bargain, that I was to receive a hundred percent of those tax benefits." (Tr. 
[1-30-91], at 76; emphasis added.) 
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the documentation. This Court should not rewrite the agreement simply because Stangl 
now regrets the language of the documents. See Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 
P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991) (courts will not "rewrite contracts entered into by 
parties dealing at arms' length, to relieve one party from a bargain later regretted, 
simply on supposed equitable principles.")28 
StangPs present belief in the absurdity of the transaction is hardly a basis for 
setting all of the documents aside and releasing him from his obligations. It would be 
even more absurd to invalidate the loan documents and to release him from the 
obligation to repay the substantial sums loaned by the Fund. The Fund has been 
unable to locate a Utah case in which the Court invalidated a contract simply because 
one of the parties came to believe it was absurd, especially after years of performing 
under the contract. Excusing a party from his contractual obligations on that ground 
would create havoc and unpredictability in the commercial world. Parties would be left 
with little confidence in the enforceability of their contracts. The policy of the law in 
this State is to enforce contracts regardless of how senseless they may seem to one of 
the panies in hindsight. Any other policy would undermine the expectations of parties 
that their contracts will be enforced by the courts. 
Further, Stangl attempts to mislead this Court by arguing that the Fund 
"assumed no risk with respect to the loan." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 21.) The rule of 
law requires enforcement of a contract, regardless of how the parties agreed to 
21
 See Siler v. Read Inv. Co., 77 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Wis. 1956) ("It must be borne in 
mind that the office of judicial construction is not to make a contract conform to the 
wishes of a party manifesting itself after the agreement has been made, but to 
determine what was agreed and set forth in the instrument itself'). 
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apportion risk. Moreover, the Fund was not without risk in the transaction. It assumed 
the risk that the Limited Partnership would fail and that Stangl would default on the 
loans, which would require the Fund to seek its remedies under the loan documents. 
The Fund acted as a prudent lender in the transaction, attempting to obtain as much 
collateral as possible, including Stangl's personal guaranty. Even so, the Fund's loan of 
over $4 million created an enormous risk. Without that loan, Stangl's project could 
never have succeeded. 
The cases cited by Stangl do not support his argument that the documents 
contain a latent ambiguity. Each of the cases involved post-closing conduct, which the 
courts considered in determining whether a contract was ambiguous. In Hamada v. 
Valley Nat'l Bank. 555 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. App. 1976), the trial court considered activities 
of a bank after the bank had received a letter from the defendant purporting to 
guarantee a single loan. Because the bank made more than one loan, this made the 
meaning of the "single loan" guarantee ambiguous. The court considered the parties' 
actions and performance to interpret the letter. The holding of Hamada is no different 
from the Utah Supreme Court's practical construction cases discussed above. 
Stangl also cites to Rodwav v. Arrow Lieht Truck Parts, Inc., 772 P.2d 1349 
(Or. App. 1989) (holding that extrinsic evidence of parties' post-execution conduct was 
admissible to define the terms "officers" and "directors" because such terms were 
ambiguous), and Pistone v. Superior Court. 279 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Cal. App. 1991) 
(remanding because post-execution conduct of parties demonstrated that agency 
relationship could have existed contrary to language of document). These cases do not 
support Stangl's absurdity argument, but they do support the Fund's argument based on 
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the trial record that the parties acted and performed consistent with the unambiguous 
language of the loan documents. 
The decision in Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So.2d 1013 (La. 1986) is also a 
practical construction case and does not support Stangl's position that an contract that 
one party believes is absurd is latently ambiguous. The Cashio court considered 
whether a restrictive covenant that provided that "no sign of any kind shall be 
displayed" in a residential subdivision was meant to prohibit political signs. The court 
concluded that it was absurd to believe that the parties would have intended political 
yard signs to be prohibited by the restrictive covenant. Id. at 1016. The court stated: 
It is well settled in the jurisprudence that in interpreting 
controversial clauses in a contract the court is guided by the 
interpretation the parties themselves placed on the agreement and 
their understanding of it as shown by their actions. . . . Thus, the 
conduct of the parties is relevant in determining their common 
intent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This is the doctrine of practical construction. In applying the doctrine, the 
Cashio coun determined from the record that political yard signs had been displayed for 
six or seven years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Because the plaintiffs had not 
challenged these previous displays, the court held that the parties did not intend to 
prohibit the display of political yard signs. 
In the present case, there exists nothing in the language of the loan 
documents that leads to absurd results. Any interpretation of the loan documents must 
be limited by the language of the documents themselves. Even if the doctrine of 
practical construction is applied, the evidence shows that Stangl and the Fund acted and 
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performed in a manner consislent with the language of the loan documents. Staiigl -
made payments on the loan tnr ne.tily lnr y< its lirlim1 defaulting. . • 
. . Ill, 
THE LOAN TRANSATT< 
A. ndii^i i> cVi^ppi vi ii.-ii> laisiir, j i ^ jj]tr.i * ires defense 
This i: - as raised and bneied by Stan. ji. the ruiid m theu Uriels hied 
:
~ UJ .irst appe». nil's 1091 Brief, at 
... h
 l i i e Fund established that: (1) because Stangl received the benefits o( 
the loan transactions and made payments thereon lui live years, lie is rsiupneil linn 
i • : 1' :: • lacks standing to assert ultra vires; (3J the 
Utah legislature ratified the io-iu transactions; (4) the loans were not ultra vires under 
Utah Code Ann *j -N ^ i <n 11 Miir,<irul I ' u t u n i l ilm IMUHJ, MTII MMH) Slan/J is still 
liable lo repay the full amount of the loans to the Fund. 
In his recent brief, Stangl cited I own of Gila Bend v. V Called Lake Dour Lu , 
Hyz Brief, at 25-26.) The holding of that case, 
... v* v**r direct;\ supports the hunds estoppel argument ^ T C , the plaintiff town 
ente.^d ini'.t a cunliMi! .villi ,i pn «"Yil( ' o m p . m y I " u i s l . i l t town 
received substantial benefits from the compam J;, .vr me contract hut tailed :«/ install 
the water main. The company suec :.. 
claimed ih.ii \\w I ontract was ultra v u o . * lie An/ona Supreme Luurt rejected the 
town's argnmerr Dtnaijs ,,r"1- *vould be grossly u ^ i : . . concerned to all - ^ 
1 
accordingly." Id. at 559.29 Applied to the present case, this rule would require Stangl 
to comply with the express terms of the loan documents, regardless of whether the 
transaction was ultra vires. Because Stangl received benefits from the loan transaction, 
he is estopped from raising that defense. 
Stangl also cited Weese v. Davis County Common, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992), 
for the rule that the ultra vires act of a county is null and void. In Weese, the private 
plaintiffs sought to enforce a contract for future merit increases against Davis County. 
Weese is factually distinguishable from the present case in which Stangl is attempting to 
avoid his obligations owed to the Fund after having received the benefits of the loan 
transactions and performed thereon for five years. The Weese Court did not consider 
whether a private party who receives benefits from an ultra vires transaction is 
estopped from raising illegality as a defense. Weese does not support Stangl's argument 
that he is not estopped.30 
B. The Utah Legislature ratified the loan transactions. 
The Utah Legislature ratified the loan transactions; by authorizing the Fund to 
make any investment in which a prudent person dealing with the property of another 
29
 Given the court's holding that the town was obligated to perform under the 
contract, the statement quoted by Stangl in his brief (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 26) is 
nothing more than dicta. Moreover, the court's statement that waiver and estoppel 
cannot be raised against the government does not support Stangl's position. 490 P.2d 
at 558. The Gila court did not state that a private party who benefits from an ultra 
vires government contract is entitled to keep the benefits without performing under the 
contract. 
30
 If the employees in Weese had received merit pay increases but had refused to 
perform their obligations, there is little doubt that the court would require them to 
perform fully, in spite of their claims that the policy was ultra vires. See Utah State 
University v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1982). 
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would invest. (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 15-16 & n.13,1 If the loans were ultra ^nVoc 
before, this amendment ratifit < . •> ih.ii ilif" rininnlnn4nl had to be 
I .y ^e \oanSm stangl reasons thai because the Legislature did 
* ? f \'pressly state . i vw amendment applied retroaci.. . / .Jcr iiic geiieidl ink, it 
cannnt opeiale i r i iudrmrk in mum iln i mi (Sfanpis 1992 Brief, at 25 n 2 ), 
4 k prudem lme'-t^r jmendment, however, applies retroactively wndLr an 
oxceprinr r^ ""he £ener^ .a^uii^n a i\a. . , i^ <_ . ^herwuod ASSIK yo 
* * , Liiv. ^lar. viUiir of Appeals ^xplaimv *kr a statuir ma\ be 
lied retroacr,\< :\ ;: n atfrc*- nnb* r-roceudiai dud n ^ «M! .. ... . .^DIs." 
•- — ^ ^ vviucL ne would have 
had if the amendment had been enacted before the contract was made," bi it a 
substantive change alters the coiiini 
Clark 1 I \ Utah 20S, 213, 192 P.2d SRO S03 H948). . • 
The "prudent investor" standaid .-• th.
 4t,rer amenunit-n. 
S * under the loan documents. The only right 
hk. ,—.biblv . <>. *: .ve losi ^ his ngiv J c urn that the transaction was ultra vires. 
The amend. *-\ iu.il iij'hr .iinl Jili^afiuns nndei the loan 
documents. Because the amendment was merely procedural, and the amendment 
should operate retroactively to ratify the loans. 
C The Court can give legajxdll^l l! *he loans. 
Finally t-stopping Stangl fr >;* raising 1. *-n ' - ^ ,,,. _ , .
 ; o j Ix, , ^ 
J - -*l ler i1 -t+^cl iu the iuans 
is io consiiw.L ...win as equii) imcbiiw * (Stangk ! ;92 Bnet at J \ ) There ai>-
several avenues available to the Court, however, that would give legal effect to the loan 
transactions, including finding that: (1) Stangl is estopped; (2) he lacks standing to 
assert ultra vires; (3) the Utah Legislature ratified the loans; (4) the loans were not 
ultra vires; or (5) as general partner and guarantor, Stangl is liable under the loans 
even though the loans were invalid. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COMPOUND INTEREST. 
Stangl did not raise this issue at trial and cannot do so for the first time on 
appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799 
P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990). The lower court ruled on the compound interest issue 
when it granted summary judgment against Stangl. Both Stangl and the Fund 
addressed the issue in their briefs in the first appeal. (StangFs 1991 Brief, at 45-47; 
Fund's 1991 Brief, at 47-49.) Because Stangl did not raise the compound interest issue 
at trial, however, that issue was not preserved for this appeal, and there exists no 
reason to rehash that issue again. 
The Fund refers the Court to the arguments contained in its brief in the first 
appeal regarding compound interest. (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 47-49.) In sum, the 
language of the Notes allowing interest on "all accrued but unpaid interest" authorizes 
compound interest at 18 percent. 
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v. 
TIif', ui #.: t icnut i R U L I : D O E S r i<>T W* <\\ J U I >< ii\ 11•:r i r • GAINST ST MVKIL 
A. Stangl did not raise the separate judgments issue at trial and cannot 
do so for the first time on appeal. 
S t a n g l ilul lnnl itilu1 w a n bi'JuU M I I I I l l ie imU'i ". t l ihMlj i ) ; n ina i hi m i l * 
"duplicative ji:'lfm'»'tir'- 'gainst him. (Stangl's IQQ? Brief, at 29-HO J Because the 
question was lawn *or the first time on appeal, Uu> Court should not considei the 
mrr i l 'i i >l I lie .ii'jr'iiiiif'fi! 
B. Separate judgments were properly entered against Stangl. 
Even considered 1 
acknowledges in Ms brief, the lower coi irt awarded *w< • ^>rnents against Stangl, one 
on his personal guarantees and the other againsi hm*
 4i :. .uHd. ifv as genera= partner 
• * "
, :,>9z briei, at o i v .iumgi concedes 
«^ r.- ihat s.tn- , . \ on** judgment is satistaction of the other. Id, It is therefore 
v 
more wian one recover. . ^ i
 u n j t!,.,.s -^; ha\e that right, and seeks to be paid oMy 
once. There was notMng improper with the lower court's awarding summary judgment 
against Stangl on his guarantees and awarding judgment against him in Ms capacity as 
general partner. 
C. I he suii^aarv judgment a^.uM - j ^ ^ i ^ _«»_ •-^ _^ i±i± * v»~ *-
violate the One Action Rule 
Stang;
 rtrgjf-N too *r..«: m' 'vr-nr,~^ iudrmen: against Stangl violated the 
I! HI i l l I f I 
linn the hist appeal (Fund's 199". Brief, a ;* : ] , , ,i, : should nut o<- revisited again, 
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particularly since it was not an issue raised at trial. In any event, the question is moot, 
since the real property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The Judgment from which Stangl 
appeals in the present case is a deficiency judgment under Section 78-37-2. Even if it 
was "procedurally incorrect" for the court to award a judgment against Stangl on his 
guarantees at the same time as the court entered a decree of foreclosure, that issue is 
not longer meritorious, since the sale has occurred and the property has been sold. 
VI. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO RECUSE JUDGE BUNNELL AS THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
This issue was fully addressed by the parties in the first appeal and the Fund 
refers the Court to its earlier brief. (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 41-47.) 
In addition to the arguments raised in his first brief, Stangl now claims that 
the lower court "exhibited a bias against Stangl that went beyond ruling in the Fund's 
favor." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 32.) As the sole example of this "bias," Stangl cites the 
trial testimony of William Chipman in which the court sustained several objections 
made by the Fund. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 33-36.) Each of the objections was 
properly sustained by the court.31 The court's rulings were correct on the merits and 
31
 The lower court correctly excluded the testimony of what Mr. Chipman 
understood about Section 4.03 of the Limited Partnership Agreement. (Tr. [1-30-91], 
at 235.) As explained above, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence of what 
the parties intended or understood regarding an unambiguous integrated contract is 
inadmissible. Also, the question whether the Fund made the capital contribution it was 
required to make was also inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and was an issue 
not previously raised. In spite of the court's sustaining of the objection, Chipman 
answered the question in the affirmative. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 236, lines 9-10.) As 
argued above, the Judge properly excluded Chipman's testimony regarding whether the 
Fund treated the transaction as an "equity." Whether the Fund so booked the 
(continued...) 
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certainly do not demonstrate "an. undue intolerance of Stangl and his posit' • " Nor do 
case." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 36.) Whether the rulings were right or wrong is for this 
Court to determine It requires more than adverse evidentiary rulings to show the kii id 
nl bur, ih;ii iri|iiiirs ilisipialifn Mtn in niiilri RmirlHi. ui iiniln l l r < * N I fJ «11 Iiif1iri.il 
Conduct. 
Ivloirovf t, IIIIIJI i 1'iilt (j.iljij, lllitli Kulcs Il "I iiuilll humliiLc, ill MrinyJ lirliewd 
liiat the court's rulings required recusal, as he argues in his brief;32 he <;houAL i*u.* 
moved the court to recuse itst-n i!as soon as practicable aflcr , , SUCH ^ ^ ^r prejudht 
3
 t . * I l u i ; 
mp ..'. ilia: th< ^>ur: committed error in not doing so at trial. 
.nvi's I lie 
j„~^ j ol this biuU- nndf". tnp same r]n\i,] ,^ Fud?f Bunnell sinrf» each belongs lo the 
retirement system, administered b> the Fin id (Fund' s 1991 Brief, at 45 ) I hat cloud 
notwithstanding, both this Coin t and the Supreme Cot lit have i i iled ::: n mai i) cases i i:i 
AIT'CI 'hr- lltan Mate Retirement Board was a party w ill lout demonstrating any bias oi 
31
 ( ...continued) 
transaction "does not chan^.- - -
 4 . ^ . ^ i b . . ...< , h, v ; ^ ,i, .,* 
documents they executed," he . • .^r. (Tr. [1-31 -01
 ls <,. ^>w, tines 15-25.) Fma-r, 
the court sustained an objettur a LS q.jr. »•->: whether the Fund had a policy u sell 
other properties at a loss. Th* .-mn agrrei; !iat the question was irrelevant ( ' 
31 91]. at 237 lines 3 ' x ' 
(Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 36.) 
influence.33 Stangl has not shown any reason not to expect the same of Judge Bunnell 
or of any other judge in this State. 
CONCLUSION 
The loan documents unambiguously required Stangl to make payments to the 
Fund, which Stangl did for nearly five years. This Court cannot rewrite the documents 
in order to transform the transaction from a loan to a partnership into the purchase of 
an "equity." Stangl is liable on his personal Guarantees, in which he waived all 
defenses relating to the collateral. Stangl is also estopped from claiming that the loans 
were ultra vires. The lower court properly refused to recuse itself, particularly when 
there is no other judge in the State who is not also entitled to retirement benefits from 
the Fund. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
33
 See Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989) (holding that 
employee was not entitled to retirement benefits); Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt 
Lake County. 780 P.2d 813 (Utah 1989) (holding that property held by the Fund was 
exempt from ad valorem property taxes); Franklin v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 779 
P.2d 680 (Utah 1989) (rejecting teachers1 equal protection claim); Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd.. 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1989) (holding that sheriffs and police chiefs 
had vested rights that could not be impaired by subsequent statutory amendment); City 
of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 1988) (holding that 
members did not have unilateral right to withdraw from retirement system prior to 
passage of statute precluding such withdrawal); Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Office. 755 P.2d 161 (Utah 1988) (holding that former employees of city hospital could 
not recover contributions made by previous employer to their retirement accounts); 
Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board. 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1982) (holding that 
Board could hire independent outside counsel); Elton v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 28 
Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972) (holding that widow of state court judge was 
entitled to widow's retirement benefits); Gottfredson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 808 
P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1991) (affirming Board's refusal to allow applicant to withdraw 
application for retirement benefits); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 
671 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that Board was equitably estopped from reducing 
employee's benefits). 
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